Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets

Bruno Jullien and Alessandro Pavan

No 13-429, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users' preferences. We first show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns and product design affecting the agents' ability to estimate their own valuations and/or the distribution of valuations on the other side of the market.

Keywords: two-sided markets; dispersed information; platform competition; global-games; informative advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08, Revised 2017-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets (2019)
Working Paper: Information Management and Pricing in Platform Markets (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:27584

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