Tit for Others' Tat. Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment

Lisa Bruttel and Werner G�th

No 85, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: Two pairs of two participants each interact repeatedly in two structurally independent but informationally linked Prisoner's Dilemma games. Neither pair receives feedback about past choices by their own partner but is fully informed about the choices by the other pair. Considering this as a four-person infinite horizon game allows for Folk-Theorem-like voluntary cooperation. We ask whether monitoring and indirect punishment with the help of others are comparable to direct monitoring and punishment in establishing and maintaining voluntary cooperation. The treatment effects we find are rather weak. Others' monitoring of own activities is only an insufficient substitute for direct observability.

Keywords: prisoner's dilemma; monitoring; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.twi-kreuzlingen.ch/wp-content/uploads/ ... 85-bruttel-gueth.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Tit for Others' Tat Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment (2013)
Working Paper: Tit for Others' Tat Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0085

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Urs Fischbacher ().