Tit for Others' Tat Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment

Lisa Bruttel and Werner Güth (gueth@coll.mpg.de)

No 2013-22, Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz

Abstract: Two pairs of two participants each interact repeatedly in two structurally independent but informationally linked Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Neither pair receives feedback about past choices by their own partner but is fully informed about the choices by the other pair. Considering this as a four-person infinite horizon game allows for Folk Theorem-like voluntary cooperation. We ask whether monitoring and indirect punishment with the help of others are comparable to direct monitoring and punishment in establishing and maintaining voluntary cooperation. The treatment effects we find are rather weak. Others’ monitoring of own activities is only an insufficient substitute for direct observability.

Keywords: prisoner’s dilemma; monitoring; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 D82 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2013-10-31
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Related works:
Working Paper: Tit for Others' Tat Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment (2013)
Working Paper: Tit for Others' Tat. Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment (2013)
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