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Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition

Joseph Farrell and Nancy T. Gallini.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Nancy Theresa Gallini () and Joseph Farrell ()

No 8618, Economics Working Papers from University of California at Berkeley

Date: 1986-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition (1988) Downloads
Working Paper: Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition (1987) Downloads
Working Paper: Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition (1987)
Working Paper: Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition (1986) Downloads
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