Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition

Joseph Farrell () and Nancy Gallini ()

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: Second-sourcing; opportunism; commitment; licensing; dynamic consistency; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987-10-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition (1988)
Working Paper: Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition (1986)
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