Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence

Klaus Abbink and Jordi Brandts

No 09-12, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient.

Keywords: secession; collective action; independence movements; laboratory experiments; rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 C93 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence (2016)
Working Paper: Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2015)
Working Paper: Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2007)
Working Paper: Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2007)
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