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How the market responds to dynamically inconsistent preferences

Ben McQuillin () and Robert Sugden

No 11-04, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This paper responds to the 'soft paternalist' argument that the findings of behavioural economics make traditional objections to paternalism incoherent. We show that there is a normatively significant sense in which, even if individuals lack coherent preferences, competitive markets are efficient in providing them with opportunities to get what they want. Extending earlier analysis by Sugden, we model a multi-period 'storage economy' and explore the implications of dynamically inconsistent preferences. We show that, despite apparent conflicts of judgement between an individual’s 'selves', competitive markets provide maximal opportunity, and that they do so by facilitating voluntary exchanges between selves.

Date: 2011-02-01
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Journal Article: How the market responds to dynamically inconsistent preferences (2012) Downloads
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