The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form

Ben McQuillin (b.mcquillin@uea.ac.uk) and Robert Sugden

No 11-09, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We propose a new type of cooperative game - a game in transition function (TF) form - as a means of representing social decision making procedures that is suitable for the analysis of rights. The TF form is a generalisation of the effectivity function (EF) form, and in particular it tells us (where the EF form does not) about the alienability of a right. We describe procedures for generating a (unique) EF game from a TF game, and for generating a (non- unique) TF game from an EF game. We make some specific proposals about the representation of rights as properties of TF games and comment on some implications about the relationship between rights and Pareto efficiency.

Keywords: Rights; inalienable rights; game forms; effectivity functions; transition functions; paretian liberal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: games in transition function form (2011)
Working Paper: The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form (2009)
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