Peer sanctioning in isomorphic provision and appropriation social dilemmas

Abhijit Ramalingam, Antonio Morales () and James Walker

No 16-09R, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This study brings together two strands of experimental literature, positive versus negative frames of social dilemmas and the effectiveness of peer sanctioning in promoting cooperation. Examining provision and appropriation games that are strategically and payoff isomorphic, we find evidence of less cooperation in the appropriation game. We also find that peer sanctioning is able to overcome the decrease in cooperation in the appropriation game, leading to greater relative increases in contributions and earnings in that decision setting. This result is linked to the fact that low contributors are targeted for punishment more frequently in the appropriation game. All the experimental findings are compatible with the existence of reciprocal preferences a la Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008).

Keywords: social dilemma; experiment; provision; appropriation; cooperation; punishment; reciprocal preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D02 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-04-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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