Wage compression and manager inequality aversion

David Johnson and Abhijit Ramalingam

No 16-13, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: Literature exploring pay finds that highly(less) productive workers often earn less (more) than they would if compensation perfectly reflected productivity, indicating "wage compression". Using a laboratory experiment, we show that such wage compression may partially be due to managers' own preference for equality.

Keywords: experiment; inequality; managers; promotions; wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 M51 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hrm
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