Focality is Intuitive - Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games

Anders Poulsen () and Axel Sonntag

No 19-01, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We experimentally examine the effects of varying time pressure in a coordination game with a label salient focal equilibrium. We consider both a pure coordination game (payoff symmetry) and a battle of the sexes game with conflict of interest (payoff asymmetry). In symmetric games, there are no effects of time pressure, since the label-salient outcome is highly focal regardless of how much time subjects have to decide. In asymmetric games, less time results in greater focality of the the label-salient action, and it becomes significantly more likely that any coordination is on the focal outcome.

Keywords: Coordination game; focal point; time pressure; response times; social heuristics hypothesis; experiment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Focality is intuitive - Experimental evidence on the effects of time pressure in coordination games (2019)
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