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Sender-Receiver Games with Endogenous Ex-Post Information Acquisition: Experimental Evidence

Anders Poulsen () and Graciela Zevallos-Porles
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Graciela Zevallos-Porles: University of East Anglia

No 19-04, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We study the effects of endogenous ex-post information acquisition on lying behavior and beliefs in a Sender-Receiver game. After choosing an action, the Receiver can decide to find out if the Sender lied or not. We observe that a significant proportion of Receivers decide to become informed, even when this information is costly. There is, however, no impact of the option of information acquisition on Sender behavior, and no evidence of Senders being shame averse.

Keywords: Sender-Receiver Games; Endogenous Ex-Post Information Acquisition; Shame Aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ore
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