When Are Nash Equilibria Self Enforcing ? An Experimental Analysis

Ken Clark, S. Kay and Martin Sefton

Working Papers from University of Iowa, Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate the effect of non-binding pre-play communication in experiments with simple two-player coordination games. We reproduce the results of other studies in which play converges to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium in the absence of communication, and communication moves outcomes in the direction of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.

Keywords: ECONOMIC; EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis (2001)
Working Paper: When Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uia:iowaec:97-04

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