Rent-Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

Michael Rusinek () and Francois Rycx

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: Using Belgian linked employer-employee data, we examine how collective bargaining arrangements affect the relationship between firms' profitability and individual wages via rent-sharing. In industries where agreements are usually renegotiated at firm-level ('decentralized industries') wages and firm-level profits are positively correlated regardless of the type of collective wage agreement by which the workers are covered (industry or firm). On the other hand, where firm-level wage renegotiation is less common ('centralized industries'), wages are only significantly related to firms' profitability for workers covered by a firm-level collective agreement. Thus, industry-wide contracts that are not complemented by a firm-level collective agreement suppress the impact of firm profits on workers' wages in centralized industries. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics.

Date: 2013-03
Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Published in: British journal of industrial relations (2013) v.51 n° 1,p.28-58

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Related works:
Journal Article: Rent-Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data (2013)
Working Paper: Rent-sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data (2009)
Working Paper: Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes: evidence from linked employer-employee data (2008)
Working Paper: Rent-Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data (2008)
Working Paper: Rent-sharing under different bargaining regimes: Evidence from linked employer-employee data (2008)
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