Research Memorandum

From Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)
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26: Antecedents of effective decision making: a cognitive approach

Allard Van Riel, J. Ouwersloot and J.G.A.M. Lemmink

26: Paracelsus (1493-1541): his relevance for modern health related policy

J.G. Backhaus

26: Modelling daily value-at-risk using realized volatility and arch type models

Pierre Giot and Sébastien Laurent

26: Smith and Rawls share a room

Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn

26: The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan, Adolphus Talman and Zaifu Yang

26: Bidding behavior in the bisection auction: an experimental investigation

E. Grigorieva and Martin Strobel

26: Stochastic machine scheduling with precedence constraints

M. Skutella and M.J. Uetz

26: Cooperative games in graph structure

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan and Adolphus Talman

26: De invloed van een beslissingsondersteunend hulpmiddel en ervaring op de beoordeling van AO/IC-beschrijvingen

V.K. Broecheler and E.H.J. Vaassen

26: Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity

S. Maus, Hans Peters and A.J.A. Storcken

26: Specialization in the presence of trade and financial integration: explorations of the integration-specialization nexus

J. Bos, Claire Economidou and Lu Zhang

26: Origins of persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area

Nils Holinski, Clemens Kool and J. Muysken

26: Single-plateaued choice

Walter Bossert and Hans Peters

26: Cooperation under incomplete contracting

Helga Habis and P. Jean-Jacques Herings

26: Relevant market and pricing behavior of regional newspapers in the Netherlands

H.L. van Kranenburg

25: Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters and A.J.A. Storcken

25: The role of public debt in the game of double chicken

Roel Beetsma and A.L. Bovenberg

25: Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn and T. Nakamura

25: Taking home bias seriously: absolute and relative measures explaining consumption risk-sharing

Nils Holinski, Clemens Kool and J. Muysken

25: Equal-budget choice equivalent solutions in exchange economies

O.L.A. Bochet

25: Bias-corrected estimation in dynamic panel data models

Maurice Bun and Martin Carree

25: The fuzzy core and the (Π, β)- balanced core

Arkadi Predtetchinski

25: Identification problems in personality psychology

Lex Borghans, Bart Golsteyn, James Heckman and John Humphries

25: Coalition formation among farsighted agents

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

25: The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity

László Kóczy and A. Nichifor

25: Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments

Friederike Mengel and Ronald Peeters

25: Mechanisms for decentralized online scheduling

B. Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller and M.J. Uetz

24: An emprically-based taxonomy of Dutch manufacturing: innovation policy implications

Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and S. Schim van der Loeff

24: Procedurally fair taxation

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski

24: Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons

Z.Z. Méder, J. Flesch and Ronald Peeters

24: Competition versus collusion: the impact of consumer inertia

Iwan Bos, E.A. Pot and Ronald Peeters

24: Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations

E. Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller and Dries Vermeulen

24: Core concepts for dynamic TU games

Hans Peters and A. Perea ý Monsuwé

24: Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers

Roel Beetsma and A.L. Bovenberg

24: Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others

Franz Dietrich and C. List

24: Elite capture, political voice and exclusion form aid: an experimental study

Ben D'Exelle and Arno Riedl

24: Fundamental tax reform in the Netherlands

S. Cnossen and A.L. Bovenberg

24: Price manipulation in an experimental asset market

Helena Veiga and Marc Vorsatz

24: Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters

Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters

23: Interest rate pass-through in the common monetary area of the SACU countries

Harald Sander and Stefanie Kleimeier

23: Tax policy in the European Union: a review of issues and options

S. Cnossen

23: The maximal domain for the revelation principle when preferences are menu dependent

R.R.S. Saran

23: Judgment aggregation without full rationality

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

23: The assembly of printed circuit boards: a case with multiple machines and multiple board types

F.C.R. Spieksma, Y. Crama, J. van de Klundert and O.E. Flippo

23: Learning during the new financial service innovation process: antecedents and performance effects

V. Blazevic and A. Lievens

23: Quantity constrained equilibria

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan and Adolphus Talman

23: Strategic disclosure of random variables

J. Flesch and A. Perea ý Monsuwé

23: Evidences of interdependence and contagion using a frequency domain framework

Vincent Bodart and Bertrand Candelon

23: A decade of combinatorial optimization

K. Aardal, C.P.M. van Hoesel, J.K. Lenstra and L. Stougie

23: That's what friends are for? The impact of peer characteristics on early school-leaving

T. Traag, M. Lubbers and Rolf Van der Velden

23: A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara

23: Tax evasion, welfare fraud, and "the Broken Windows" effect: an experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

Mathieu Lefebvre, Pierre Pestieau, Arno Riedl and Marie Claire Villeval

23: Intransitive aggregated preferences

A.J.A. Storcken

23: A general structure theorem for the nash equilibrium correspondence

Arkadi Predtetchinski