Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making: An experimental analysis
Amadou Boly,
Robert Gillanders and
Topi Miettinen
No wp-2016-137, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)
Abstract:
In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A's decision before making their own. There are four treatments: three with deterrence and one without. We find a peer effect in embezzlement in that facing an honest Official A reduces embezzlement by Official B. Likewise, deterrence matters in that higher detection probabilities significantly decrease embezzlement.
Keywords: Corruption; Laboratory experiment; Peer effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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