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Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making: An experimental analysis

Amadou Boly, Robert Gillanders () and Topi Miettinen ()

No wp-2016-137, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A's decision before making their own. There are four treatments: three with deterrence and one without. We find a peer effect in embezzlement in that facing an honest Official A reduces embezzlement by Official B. Likewise, deterrence matters in that higher detection probabilities significantly decrease embezzlement.

Keywords: Corruption; Laboratory experiment; Peer effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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