Moderating Government

Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris () and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

No 09/2011, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government.

Keywords: voting; proportional rule; majority; parliament. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Moderating Government (2015)
Working Paper: Moderating Government (2011)
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