Naked exclusion in the lab: The case of sequential contracting

Jan Boone (), Wieland Müller and Sigrid Suetens
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Jan Boone: https://econ.univie.ac.at

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000b), we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it leads to lower exclusion costs for the incumbent, than simultaneous contracting. We find that an incumbent who proposes exclusive contracts to buyers sequentially, is better able to deter entry than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously. In contrast to theory, this comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent.

JEL-codes: C91 L12 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
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Journal Article: Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1109

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