Community based targeting mechanisms for social safety nets

Jonathan Conning and Michael Kevane

No 23146, Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper interprets case studies, and theory on community involvement in beneficiary selection, and benefit delivery for social safety nets. Several considerations should be carefully balanced in assessing the advantages of using community groups as targeting agents. First, benefits from utilizing local information, and social capital may be eroded by costly rent-seeking. Second, the potential improvement in targeting criteria from incorporating local notions of deprivation, must be tempered by the possibility of program capture by local elites, and by the possibility that local preferences are not pro-poor. Third, performance may be undermined by unforeseen strategic targeting by local communities in response to national funding, and evaluation criteria, or by declines in political support.

Keywords: Community Development and Empowerment; Governance Indicators; Social Capital; Safety Nets and Transfers; Services&Transfers to Poor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-01-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:hdnspu:23146

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