Caste and punishment: the legacy of caste culture in norm enforcement

Karla Hoff, Mayuresh Kshetramade and Ernst Fehr

No 5040, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Well-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. This paper studies how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy - the caste system - affects individuals'willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although the analysis controls for individual wealth, education, and political participation, low-caste individuals exhibit a much lower willingness to punish norm violations that hurt members of their own caste, suggesting a cultural difference across caste status in the concern for members of one’s own community. The lower willingness to punish may inhibit the low caste’s ability to sustain collective action and so may contribute to its economic vulnerability.

Keywords: Gender and Social Development; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; Anthropology; Access to Finance; Social Inclusion&Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cwa, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-ltv, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Caste and Punishment: the Legacy of Caste Culture in Norm Enforcement (2011)
Working Paper: Caste and punishment: the legacy of caste culture in norm enforcement (2010)
Working Paper: Caste and Punishment: The Legacy of Caste Culture in Norm Enforcement (2009)
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