Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

Tibor Neugebauer, Javier Perote, Ulrich Schmidt and Malte Loos
Additional contact information
Malte Loos: University Kiel

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The recent literature suggests that people have social preferences with a self-serving bias. Our data analysis reveals that the stylized fact of declining cooperation in repeated public goods experiments results from this bias and adaptation.

Keywords: experimental economics; information feedback; public goods; voluntary contributions; conditional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2005-03-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/exp/papers/0503/0503009.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2009)
Working Paper: Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0503009

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