Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

Tibor Neugebauer, Javier Perote, Ulrich Schmidt and Malte Loos

No 1376, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others' contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias.

Keywords: Information feedback; Public goods; Voluntary contributions; Conditional cooperation; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/4066/1/kap1376.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2009)
Working Paper: Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1376

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