Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable

Federico Echenique and Aaron Edlin ()

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2003-03-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
Note: 24 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2002)
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2002)
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2002)
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303003

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