Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable

Federico Echenique and Aaron Edlin

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: mixed-strategy equilibrium; learning; supermodular games; strategic complementaries; equilibrium selection; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2003)
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2002)
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2002)
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable (2001)
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