Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable

Federico Echenique and Aaron S. Edlin

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.

Keywords: mixed-strategy equilibrium; learning; supermodular games; strategic complementarities; equilibrium selection; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2002)
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements Are Unstable (2002)
Working Paper: Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt26r9r912

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