Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards A Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation In The Internet Age

Joseph Farrell () and Philip J. Weiser
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Philip J. Weiser: Law & Telecommunications, University of Colorado

Industrial Organization from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and post-Chicago School arguments in assessing whether regulation should mandate open access to information platforms. The authors outline three alternative models that the FCC could adopt to guide its regulation of information platforms in the future and facilitate a true convergence between antitrust and regulatory policy.

JEL-codes: K0 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2003-03-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-net
Note: 51 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/io/papers/0303/0303007.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age (2003)
Working Paper: Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0303007

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