Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age

Joseph Farrell () and Philip J. Weiser

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: This article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and post-Chicago School arguments in assessing whether regulation should mandate open access to information platforms. The authors outline three alternative models that the FCC could adopt to guide its regulation of information platforms in the future and facilitate a true convergence between antitrust and regulatory policy.

Keywords: vertical integration; leverage; ICE; one monopoly profit; antitrust; telecommunications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09-24
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (58)

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Working Paper: Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt4dh7q2dd

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