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Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives

Marcus Miller and Benjamin Zissimos

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: From a wide-ranging historical survey, Acemoglu and Robinson conclude that the preservation of liberty depends on being in a ‘narrow corridor’ where there is a balance of power between the state and society. We first examine the support Binmore's game-theoretic treatment of Social Contracts provides for such a ‘narrow corridor’ of liberty and justice – and what extremes to expect without them. We also consider how the biological model of Competing Species helps to describe the dynamics of conflicting powers outside the narrow corridor– where, as in contemporary Russia and China, any Social Contracts that exist are neither free nor fair.

Keywords: liberty; social contracts; repeated games; Competing Species; anarchy; Despotism; Neofeudalism JEL Classification: C70; C73; P00; Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-gth, nep-his and nep-tra
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Working Paper: Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives (2021) Downloads
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