Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives

Marcus Miller and ,
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Benjamin C. Zissimos

No 16695, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: From a wide-ranging historical survey, Acemoglu and Robinson conclude that the preservation of liberty depends on being in a ‘narrow corridor’ where there is a balance of power between the state and society. We first examine the support Binmore's game-theoretic treatment of Social Contracts provides for such a ‘narrow corridor’ of liberty and justice – and what extremes to expect without them. We also consider how the biological model of Competing Species helps to describe the dynamics of conflicting powers outside the narrow corridor– where, as in contemporary Russia and China, any Social Contracts that exist are neither free nor fair.

Keywords: Liberty; Social contracts; Repeated games; Competing species; Anarchy; Despotism; Neofeudalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 P00 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP16695 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16695

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP16695

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().