Sandbagging

Matthias Kräkel

No 12/2011, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: Participants of dynamic competition games may prefer to play with the rules of the game by systematically withholding e¤ort in the beginning. Such behavior is referred to as sandbagging. I consider a two-period con- test between heterogeneous players and analyze potential sandbagging of high-ability participants in the first period. Such sandbagging can be ben- eficial to avoid second-period matches against other high-ability opponents. I characterize the conditions under which sandbagging leads to a coordina- tion problem, similar to that of the battle-of-the sexes game. Moreover, if players' abilities have a stronger impact on the outcome of the first-period contest than e¤ort choices, mutual sandbagging by all high-ability players can arise.

Keywords: ecoordination problem; dynamic contest; heterogeneous contestants; withholding effort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Journal Article: Sandbagging (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:122012

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