Sandbagging

Matthias Kräkel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Matthias Kräkel

Journal of Sports Economics, 2014, vol. 15, issue 3, 263-284

Abstract: Participants of dynamic contests sometimes play with the rules of the game by withholding effort in the beginning. Such behavior is referred to as sandbagging. I consider a two-period contest between heterogeneous players and analyze potential sandbagging of high-ability participants in period one. This sandbagging can be beneficial to avoid second-period matches against other high-ability opponents. I characterize the conditions under which sandbagging leads to a coordination problem, similar to that of the battle of the sexes. Moreover, if players' abilities have a stronger impact on the outcome of the first-period contest than effort choices, mutual sandbagging by all high-ability players can arise.

Keywords: coordination problem; dynamic contest; heterogeneous contestants; withholding effort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:15:y:2014:i:3:p:263-284

DOI: 10.1177/1527002512449349

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