Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments

Matthias Kräkel and Dirk Sliwka

No 33/2001, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts decrease (increase) with risk if abilities are sufficiently similar (different). Risk also affects winning probabilities. The interaction of both effects is analyzed.

Keywords: effort effect; likelihood effect; risk taking; tournament (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 J3 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Journal Article: Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments (2004)
Journal Article: Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:332001

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