Through Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case
Hans-Theo Normann and
No 6/2000, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.
Keywords: learning; Cournot oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:62000
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