The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance

Marta Serra-Garcia and Nora Szech

No 120, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: We investigate the elasticity of preferences for moral ignorance with respect to monetary incentives and social norm information. We propose a model where uncertainty differentially decreases the moral costs of unethical behavior, and benchmark the demand curve for moral ignorance against a morally neutral context. In line with the model, selfishness is a main determinant of moral ignorance, and the demand curve for moral ignorance is highly elastic when information shifts from being costly to incentivized. Moral ignorance is considered morally inappropriate. Providing this information increases moral behavior but does not shift the demand curve for ignorance.

Keywords: information avoidance; morality; unethical behavior; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hpe
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Related works:
Journal Article: The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance (2022)
Working Paper: The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance (2019)
Working Paper: The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance (2019)
Working Paper: The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance (2019)
Working Paper: The (in)elasticity of moral ignorance (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kitwps:120

DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000089263

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