Choice architecture and incentives increase COVID-19 vaccine intentions and test demand

Marta Serra-Garcia and Nora Szech

No 150, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: Willingness to vaccinate and test are critical in the COVID-19 pandemic. We study the effects of two measures to increase vaccination and testing: "choice architecture" and monetary compensations. Choice architecture has the goal of "nudging" people into a socially desired direction without affecting their choice options. Compensations reward vaccine takers and are already in use by some organizations. Yet there is the concern that compensations may decrease vaccination if compensations erode intrinsic motivation to vaccinate. We show that both approaches, compensations and choice architecture, significantly increase COVID-19 test and vaccine demand. Yet, for vaccines, low compensations can backfire.

Keywords: choice architecture; incentives; COVID-19; vaccine hesitancy; test avoidance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D04 I12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-ore
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/233118/1/1755111134.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Choice Architecture and Incentives Increase COVID-19 Vaccine Intentions and Test Demand (2021)
Working Paper: Choice architecture and incentives increase COVID-19 vaccine intentions and test demand (2021)
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