Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game: An experimental analysis

Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Sven Haller, Tyll Krüger, Thomas Neumann, Stephan Schosser and Bodo Vogt

No 6, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and information on behavioral choices and determined the equilibria. We observed that the participants' risk attitudes failed to explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, beliefs appeared to be a better predictor of whether or not they would opt for the corrupt alternative. Furthermore, varying the quantity of information available to players (modeled by changing the degree of uncertainty) provided additional insight into the players' propensity to engage in corrupt behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption.

Keywords: Corruption; game theory; experiment; risk attitude; beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a Corruption Game – An experimental analysis (2013)
Working Paper: Risk Attitude, Beliefs, and Information in a Corruption Game - An Experimental Analysis (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kitwps:6

DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000019775

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