A quantitative version of Myerson regularity

Nikolaus Schweizer and Nora Szech

No 76, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as a quantitative measure of how regular a distribution is. L-regularity includes Myerson regularity and the monotone hazard rate condition as special cases. We show that L-regularity implies sharp bounds on various key quantities in auction theory, thus extending several recent findings from quantitative auction and mechanism design.

Keywords: L-regularity; Myerson regularity; Monotone Hazard Rate; Auctions; Mechanism Design; Approximation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:kitwps:76

DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000051310

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