How ultimatum offers emerge: A study in bounded rationality

Werner Güth ()

No 2000,29, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: The general framework of decision emergence (Güth, 2000a) is applied to the specific decision task of a proposer in ultimatum bargaining, i.e. to choosing how much the responder should be offered. For this purpose the Master Module as well as its submodules New Problem Solver, Adaptation Procedure, and Learning have to be specified for the task at hand. This illustrates the applicability of the general framework of boundedly rational decision emergence.

Date: 2000
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Journal Article: How Ultimatum Offers Emerge: A Study in Bounded Rationality (2001)
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