Merger in contests

Steffen Huck, Kai Konrad and Wieland Müller

No 2000,3, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants.

Keywords: contests; merger (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L11 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Merger in Contests (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb373:20003

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