Capacity choices and price competition in experimental markets

Vital Anderhub, Werner Güth (), Ulrich Kamecke and Hans-Theo Normann

No 2001,10, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: In the heterogeneous experimental oligopoly markets of this paper, sellers first choose capacities and then prices. In equilibrium, capacities should correspond to the Cournot prediction. In the experimental data, given capacities, observed price setting behavior is in general consistent with the theory. Capacities converge above the Cournot level. Sellers rarely manage to cooperate.

Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets (2003)
Working Paper: Capacity Cjoices and Price Competition in Experimental Market (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200110

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