I want you!: An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power

Jordi Brandts, Werner Güth () and Andreas Stiehler

No 2002,51, SFB 373 Discussion Papers from Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Abstract: We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: I want YOU! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power (2002)
Working Paper: I want YOU! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power (2002)
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