Welfare effects of public service broadcasting in a free-to-air TV market
Julia Rothbauer and
Gernot Sieg
No 13, Economics Department Working Paper Series from Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department
Abstract:
Viewer's private information consumption generates external benefits for society, because information improves the ability of voters to control politicians. Our study compares two settings in a free-to-air TV market: a differentiated duopoly of private channels and an oligopoly with both private channels and a public service broadcaster broadcasting information as well as entertainment programs. We find that welfare effects of public service broadcasting depend on its program design and cost efficiency, the external benefits of voter's information, and the magnitude of lost rents from the advertising market.
Keywords: Media; two-sided TV market; information externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L32 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-cul
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51315/1/671188283.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Welfare Effects of Public Service Broadcasting in a Free-to-Air TV Market (2013) 
Working Paper: Welfare effects of public service broadcasting in a free-to-air TV market (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tbswps:13
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