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Welfare Effects of Public Service Broadcasting in a Free-to-Air TV Market

Gernot Sieg and Julia Rothbauer

VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: A welfare-maximizing Public Service Broadcaster (PSB) broadcasts both information-type and show-type content if (i) the information consumption of TV viewers generates external benefits for society by improving the ability of voters to control politicians and (ii) the marginal external benefits of information consumption diminish as the information possessed by voters increases. We analyze a two-sided free-to-air TV market with two differentiated private channels and a commercial-free PSB. Welfare depends on the efficiency of the PSB, the external benefits of voter information, and lost rents from the advertising market. Welfare can be higher without a PSB.

JEL-codes: D72 L32 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-cul, nep-ind, nep-mkt, nep-net and nep-reg
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/79800/1/VfS_2013_pid_64.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Welfare effects of public service broadcasting in a free-to-air TV market (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Welfare effects of public service broadcasting in a free-to-air TV market (2011) Downloads
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