Adverse Selection and Information Advantages of Training Firms

Jens Mohrenweiser, Gaby Wydra-Sommaggio and Thomas Zwick

VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: The possibility of adverse selection by training firms is common theoretical argument for company-sponsored investments in general skills. The paper derives a public and a private signal after apprenticeship training and shows that training firms are able to positively select graduates they keep. The public signal has a stronger impact on entry wages of employer changers than for stayers and private signals shows exactly the opposite pattern.

JEL-codes: J24 J31 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100525

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