EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Over-caution of large committees of experts

Rune Midjord, Tomás Rodríguez and Justin Valasek ()

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a proposed innovation on behalf of 'society'. Each expert's signal about the innovation's quality is generated by the available evidence and the best practices of the experts' common discipline, which is only indirectly related to the true state of the world. In addition to a payoff linked to the adequateness of the committee's decision, each expert receives a disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated innovation. No matter how small the disesteem payoffs are, information aggregation fails in large committees: under any majority rule, the committee rejects the innovation almost surely.

Keywords: Committees; Information aggregation; Disesteem payoffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ino and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/86145/1/770689183.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Over-Caution of Large Committees of Experts (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Over-Caution of Large Committees of Experts (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2013313

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change from WZB Berlin Social Science Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().

 
Page updated 2022-12-01
Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2013313