Merger and collusion in contests

Kollusion und Fusion in Contests

Steffen Huck, Kai Konrad and Wieland Müller

No FS IV 01-04, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.

Keywords: Contests; merger; collusion; promotional competition; Kampf um Marktanteile; Kollusion; Fusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L11 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Merger and Collusion in Contests (2002)
Working Paper: Merger and collusion in contests (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0104

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