Altruism and envy in contests: an evolutionarily stable symbiosis

Altruismus und Neid in Turnieren: Eine evolutionär-stabile Symbiose

Kai Konrad

No FS IV 02-19, Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

Keywords: Altruism; envy; contests; evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D64 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Related works:
Journal Article: Altruism and envy in contests: An evolutionarily stable symbiosis (2004)
Working Paper: Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:fsiv0219

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