Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis

Kai Konrad

No 825, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

Keywords: altruism; envy; contests; evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Related works:
Journal Article: Altruism and envy in contests: An evolutionarily stable symbiosis (2004)
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