Altruism and envy in contests: An evolutionarily stable symbiosis

Kai Konrad

Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 22, issue 3, 479-490

Abstract: Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis (2002)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0229-7

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