Moral cost, commitment, and committee size

Moralische Kosten, Selbstbindung und die Größe von Komitees

Steffen Huck and Kai Konrad

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who vote in favor of default. We show that in such situations small committees are more likely to default than large committees. Thus, constituencies can decide about degrees of commitment by choosing committee sizes appropriately. Experimental data confirms our predictions.

Keywords: coordination; commitment; democracy; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Related works:
Journal Article: Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200331

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